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Curbing reckless and predatory lending: A
statutory analysis of South Africa’s National
Credit Act
Andrew D Schmulow*
This article provides a statement and an analysis of South Africa’s statutory
provisions aimed at curbing reckless lending, and preventing predatory
lending, to financial consumers. The focus of the article is on the statutory
mechanisms for combatting reckless and predatory lending, including a
critique of the success or otherwise of the implementation of the relevant
legislation. The article aims to provide a comparative analysis of what is,
overall, an innovative and effective regime, the aim of which is to protect
vulnerable financial consumers from reckless and predatory lending
practices. As such, it is hoped, that the article will provide useful techniques
for the protection of borrowers in other common law jurisdictions, such as
Australia, Canada and the United States, or indeed wherever vulnerable
consumers of finance are liable to be exploited.

I Introduction
South Africa is a developing country,1 with a population of approximately
55 million people,2 of which 40 million are regarded as economically-active,
and fall between the ages of 15 and 64.3 Of this, approximately 25 per cent are
unemployed,4 and in excess of 2.5 million adults are classified as illiterate.5
This presents opportunities for unscrupulous financial service providers, and
* BA Honours LLB (Witwatersrand) PhD (Melbourne); Senior Lecturer in Law and Director
designate, Business Law, School of Law, The University of Western Australia; Advocate of
the High Court of South Africa; Principal, Clarity Prudential Regulatory Consulting Pty Ltd;
Visiting Researcher, Oliver Schreiner School of Law, University of the Witwatersrand,
Johannesburg; Visiting Researcher, Centre for International Trade, Sungkyunkwan
University, Seoul. The author acknowledges with gratitude the helpful comments made by
Professors Camilla Baasch Andersen and Nolan Sharkey in the Law School at the University
of Western Australia, and Professor Tanya Woker, in the Law School at the University of
Kwa-Zulu Natal, and a member of the National Consumer Tribunal of the Republic of South
Africa; and the generous assistance of various colleagues in South African Law Schools in
the preparation of this research: Michelle Kelly-Low at the University of South Africa; the
Editor and staff of Obiter and De Jure; ongoing support from the Oliver Schreiner School of
Law at Witwatersrand University, and in particular Maggie Lediga in the library; the staff of
the Law Society of the Northern Provinces; and the ongoing support and encouragement
from the Centre for International Finance and Regulation (CIFR), in Sydney, Australia. The
author may be contacted at Andy.Schmulow@uwa.edu.au.
1 United Nations New York, World Economic Situation and Prospects 2015, Statistical Annex
(2015) 140.
2 Statistics South Africa, Mid-Year Population Estimates, Statistical Release No P0302
(23 July 2015) 2. Up from 52 million according to the 2011 census. SouthAfrica.info, South
Africa’s Population (October 2015) <http://www.southafrica.info/about/people/population.
htm#.Vk1NgoSZgVw>.
3 Jami Solli-Hubbard (ed), Responsible Lending: An International Landscape (Consumers
International, November 2013) 71.
4 United Nations, above n 1, 156.
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especially lenders, to take advantage of the large number of unsophisticated
financial consumers in South Africa. It is within this context that the South
African legislation is noteworthy.
amount of credit granted to consumers has increased substantially from R1.1 trillion
in 2007 to R1.5 trillion in 2014. There were 21.7 million credit active consumers and
out of these, 9.6 million (44.2%) had impaired records. This increase has also led to
an evolution of the problem of household over-indebtedness. Household debt to
disposable income in South Africa is still high, even though the overall household
indebtedness is actually down from its early peaks: Q4 2008 — 81.9% and this fell
to 74.3% in Q4 2013. This is an indication that a large portion of household incomes
still goes to servicing debt.6

As an expression of an overarching policy for the protection of financial
consumers, South Africa’s National Parliament enacted the National Credit
Act7 in 2005. Its aim was to address the inadequacies of the previous
legislative regime,8 which included an outdated and ineffective regulatory
framework,9 comprised of inadequate mechanisms to promote the
rehabilitation of consumers, or to assist already over-indebted consumers to
deal with their debt.10
The objects and purport of this Act are, inter alia, to combat reckless
lending11 (that is to say lending which is reckless as regards a particular
consumer’s existing indebtedness), combat the problem of over-indebtedness
generally,12 and prohibit predatory lending.
There are many who criticize this legislation, arguing that this will overburden the
economy and will lead to significant costs for business ... despite the increased costs
for business, the legislation is necessary in order to prevent the exploitation of
consumers ... many acknowledge that the introduction of the National Credit Act
shielded South Africa from some of the worst excesses of the global recession of
2008/2009.13
5 Stephanie Pretorius, ‘SA’s Real Level of Literacy’, The Citizen, 29 August 2013
<http://citizen.co.za/31407/literatez/>.
6 National Credit Regulator, Annual Report 2014 (2014) 12.
7 National Credit Act 2005 (South Africa).
8 Megan Whittaker, ‘South Africa’s National Credit Act: A Possible Model for the Proper Role
of Interest Rate Ceilings for Microfinance’ (2008) 28 Northwestern Journal of International
Law & Business 561, 569ff; Stefan Renke, Melanie Roestoff and Franciscus Haupt, ‘The
National Credit Act: New Parameters for the Granting of Credit in South Africa’ (2007) 28
Obiter 229, 230ff.
9 Department of Trade and Industry, Republic of South Africa, Consumer Credit Law Reform:
Policy Framework for Consumer Credit (August 2004) 13.
10 Ibid 13 [2.9].
11 See definition below, ‘Section 80: Reckless credit’. See also: CM Van Heerden and
A Boraine, ‘The Money or the Box: Perspectives on Reckless Credit in Terms of the
National Credit Act 34 of 2005’ (2011) 44 De Jure 392.
12 National Credit Act s 3(g). See also ch 4 pt D ss 78–88 (‘Over-indebtedness and reckless
credit’) See also: Department of Trade and Industry, Republic of South Africa, above n 9,
30–2.
13 Tanya Woker, ‘Why the Need for Consumer Protection Legislation? A Look at Some of the
Reasons Behind the Promulgation of the National Credit Act and the Consumer Protection
Act’ (2010) 31 Obiter 217, 217.
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This is the first time in the history of South Africa’s consumer-credit
legislation that such provisions have been enacted.14 The legislative
mechanisms employed are at once farsighted and straightforward, and serve as
a useful comparative model that other jurisdictions may wish to study in order,
similarly, to discourage reckless and predatory lending.
Predatory lending creates overly indebted consumers, threatens livelihoods, and can
trap people in a cycle of poverty.15

The Act provides, chiefly, 12 innovations. These are as follows:
(i) Credit agreements must be in plain language.16
(ii) All credit agreements must contain a quote as to costs, and the issuer
is bound by the quote for 5 days.17
(iii) The Act prescribes information that must be included regarding the
costs of credit, to be contained in all advertising and marketing
materials.18
(iv) Credit sales at a person’s private dwelling or place of employment
are strictly limited.19
(v) Reasons must be provided if a credit application is declined.20
(vi) Automatic increases in credit limits are prohibited,21 save for where
the consumer has agreed in writing to such increases,22 subject to
strict conditions.
(vii) Reckless lending is prohibited.23
(viii) Interest, fees and charges are regulated on all agreements, including
microloans.24
(ix) Credit Bureau is regulated25 and consumers have the right to a free
credit bureau record.26
(x) Debt counselling is introduced, to enable restructuring of debts for
over-indebted consumers.27
(xi) The Act promotes the development of a ‘fair, transparent,
competitive, sustainable, responsible, efficient, effective and
14 Renke, Roestoff and Haupt, above n 8, 244.
15 South Africa’s Finance Minister, Pravin Gordhan, quoted in: Milford Bateman, ‘Microcredit
and Marikana: How They Are Linked’, The Star, 18 September 2012, 3 <http://sbeta.
iol.co.za/the-star/microcredit-and-marikana-how-they-are-linked-1385126>.
16 National Credit Act s 64 (1)(b).
17 Ibid s 92(3).
18 Ibid ss 76(4)(d), (5), 92.
19 Ibid s 75.
20 Ibid s 62.
21 Ibid s 74(2).
22 Ibid s 119(4).
23 Ibid s 80.
24 Ibid ss 102–3. Cf the position in the United States, see: AnnaMaria Andriotis, ‘Payday
Lenders’ Move to Installment Loans Increases Risks, Report Finds’, The Wall Street Journal,
11 August 2016 <https://www.wsj.com/articles/payday-lenders-move-to-installment-loansincreases-risks-report-finds-1470927635>.
25 National Credit Act s 43.
26 Ibid s 70.
27 National Credit Act ss 14(a), 44, 46, 47(1), 48(2), 61(2)(c), 71, 83(3)(b)(ii), 85(a)–(b); 86–8;
129–30; 139(1)(b)(i), 152(1)(e).
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accessible credit market and industry’,28 by, inter alia, monitoring the
‘levels of consumer indebtedness and the incidence and social effects
of over-indebtedness’,29 by conducting research and developing
policies and proposing legislative amendments.30
(xii) The Act establishes a National Credit Tribunal.31
First this article will provide a definition of reckless and predatory lending,
followed by an analysis of how consumer protection policy is expressed by the
National Credit Act. Third, an analysis of key provisions of the Act, and then
fourth, a discussion of enforcement mechanisms. Finally, concluding
observations are provided.
Throughout this article consumers will be taken to mean individual
consumers who are natural persons. Issues in the protection of sophisticated
consumers, or corporations as consumers, are not canvassed.

II Reckless and predatory lending defined
A Reckless lending
Reckless lending is a category of malpractice undoubtedly more egregious
than irresponsible lending.32 Where irresponsible lending refers to credit
extended despite being unsuitable to a consumer’s needs, reckless lending is
understood in English common-law as more akin to gross negligence or a
reckless disregard for serious harm.33
Wilson34 is of the view that the South African approach is, as a result, more
restrictive than an approach which prohibits irresponsible lending. She cites as
evidence the consumer’s obligation to answer truthfully all questions put to
them by the lender, where a failure to do so will afford the lender a complete
defence35 against a claim of reckless lending. She states therefore, that the
‘consumer is therefore responsible for “reckless” borrowing’.36
Based upon a comprehensive review of the Act, however, this analysis does
not take into account the Act’s emphasis on the responsibility of the lender to
ask whatever questions are pertinent and to take reasonable steps to ensure
that the consumer understands and appreciates the risks and the costs of the
loan;37 to assess the consumer’s debt-repayment history;38 and to assess the
consumer’s existing financial means and obligations.39 If after all of those
enquiries have been made, a consumer fails to answer fully and truthfully, that
will nonetheless not be a complete defence, as Wilson asserts. It will only
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Ibid s 13(a).
Ibid ss 13(c)(iv), 70(5).
Ibid s 13(d).
Ibid ss 26–7.
Therese Wilson, ‘The Responsible Lending Response’ in Therese Wilson (ed), International
Responses to Issues of Credit and over-Indebtedness in the Wake of Crisis (Ashgate, 2013)
84.
Ibid.
Ibid.
National Credit Act s 81(4).
Wilson, above n 32.
National Credit Act s 81(2)(a)(i).
Ibid s 81(2)(a)(ii).
Ibid s 81(2)(a)(iii).
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become a complete defence if the lender can demonstrate that the consumer’s
failure to answer fully and truthfully had a material effect on the lender’s
ability to make a proper assessment.40
Consequently, a better understanding of the choice of the word ‘reckless’ in
the Act may be one of semantics, and may in fact in the case of the South
African legislation be more akin to ‘irresponsible’. To this end, Rapp states as
follows:
falling somewhere between ‘negligence’ and ‘intentional misconduct,’ recklessness
has evaded precise judicial interpretation for two hundred years.41

In South Africa, reckless lending is defined by the Act42 by reference to
processes and outcomes, specifically: as a failure to take reasonable steps to
assess whether the consumer understands their rights and obligations under a
credit agreement, along with a failure to assess the consumer’s credit history,
coupled with a failure to assess the consumer’s capacity to repay, taking
account of their current obligations. If the consumer is applying for a loan for
a commercial purpose, the lender must take reasonable steps to assess the
feasibility and the potential success of the venture. If the outcomes of such
assessments were against lending the consumer money, and in addition,
lending to the consumer would leave them over-indebted, but the lender
extended the loan nonetheless, then that loan would be regarded as ‘reckless’.

B Predatory lending
Predatory lending is more difficult to define. Engle and McCoy43 define
predatory lending to include at least two of the following: loans which result
in serious harm to consumers; harmful rent seeking; loans involving fraud and
deception; other instances of a lack of transparency which are not actionable
as fraud; and requiring consumers to surrender their rights to legal redress.44
Goldstein45 defines predatory lending as containing three sets of essential
characteristics, namely those relating to the terms and consequences of the
loan; the manner in which the consumer obtained the loan; and finally, the
power imbalance between the lender and the consumer, with particular
reference to the consumer’s experience and access to information.

C Reckless as compared to predatory lending
Effectively, these are matters of degree. Put simply, reckless lending ignores
a consumer’s circumstances. Predatory lending actively preys upon those
circumstances. The Act specifically addresses ‘reckless lending’46 but,
40 Ibid s 81(4)(b).
41 Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, ‘The Wreckage of Recklessness’ (2008) 86 Washington
University Law Review 111, 111.
42 National Credit Act s 80.
43 Kathleen C Engel and Patricia A McCoy, ‘A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics
of Predatory Lending’ (2002) 80 Texas Law Review 1255.
44 Ibid 1260. See also Kathleen C Engel and Patricia A McCoy, ‘Turning a Blind Eye: Wall
Street Finance of Predatory Lending’ (2007) 75 Fordham Law Review 2039, 2043.
45 Ira Goldstein, ‘Why the Poor Pay More: How to Stop Predatory Lending’ in Gregory D
Squires (ed), Business & Economics (Greenwood Publishing, 2004) 40.
46 See ‘Section 80: Reckless credit’ below.
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because predatory lending cannot be precisely defined, by addressing other
malpractices that would typically enable predatory lending,47 the Act seeks to
address that phenomenon too. It must be acknowledged, however, that in
South Africa this has met with mixed results.
One, typical example of predatory lending often takes the form of so-called
‘payday’ loans,48 and there are examples of these in South Africa. While
payday loans are not in and of themselves predatory, they often have predatory
characteristics. Despite the legislative attempts to curb predatory lending in
South Africa, there is evidence of predatory practices, and often these have
been concealed within payday loans. Indeed, there is evidence not only of
predatory payday lending practices in South Africa under the Act but,
furthermore, that these practices were so egregious that they triggered civil
unrest, which precipitated the ‘Marikana massacre’.49

III The National Credit Act as consumer policy
A Aims
The purpose of the National Credit Act is to:
promote a fair and non-discriminatory marketplace for access to consumer credit[50]
and for that purpose to provide for the general regulation of consumer credit ... and
improved standards of consumer information; ... to prohibit certain unfair credit and
credit-marketing practices; to promote responsible credit granting ... to prohibit
reckless credit granting; ... to establish national norms and standards relating to
consumer credit; to promote a consistent enforcement framework ... establish the
National Credit Regulator and the National Consumer Tribunal ...51

The Act therefore seeks to do a number of things. These range from
prohibiting reckless credit extension to creating a fairer industry, serving,
henceforth, better-informed consumers. The Act tackles predatory lending
practices by prohibiting misleading and unfair marketing and selling
practices52 — an important provision in a society with a large number of
financially unsophisticated consumers (see for example ss 90 (2)(a)(i)–(ii),53
which makes void any credit contract that contains provisions which are
deceptive or fraudulent), and includes outlawing negative option marketing —
that is to say, an agreement whereby silence will be regarded as consent, to the
creation of the agreement.54
This is a reflection of the concerns of the legislator: that in a country where
many consumers are semi- or illiterate, opportunities for unscrupulous lenders
to prey upon the weakest and most vulnerable consumers are almost limitless.
47 See ‘Section 90: Unlawful provisions of credit agreement’ below.
48 See: Creola Johnson, ‘Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?’ (2002) 87
Minnesota Law Review 1, 2–4.
49 See further: ‘F The “Marikana” connection’ below.
50 For a definition of what constitutes a credit agreement under the Act, see: Renke, Roestoff
and Haupt, above n 8, 235.
51 National Credit Act Preamble.
52 Ibid s 76(4)(c)(ii).
53 Ibid.
54 National Credit Act s 74(1).
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Moreover, the provisions aimed at prohibiting misleading and unfair
conduct are worded sufficiently broadly that a court or tribunal can evaluate,
on a case-by-case basis, whether a particular practice is unfair or misleading,
having regard to the circumstances of a particular consumer.
This is a feature that occurs throughout the Act: the onus is placed squarely
upon lenders to both conduct themselves appropriately, and to know their
customers, while courts and tribunals are empowered to take account of the
consumers they have before them: consumers who are illiterate or
semiliterate, and who represent the easiest prey to unscrupulous lenders would
be entitled, under the Act, to protection from courts or tribunals,
commensurate with their vulnerability. This acknowledgement in the Act of
the different strata of consumers, and the different levels of protection that
may be afforded, by way of leeway granted to courts and tribunals, places
consumer protection at the core of this Act, and is, it is argued, from the
standpoint of consumer policy, one of the most outstanding features of the
South African legislation.
The Act prohibits unilateral changes to a credit agreement, notwithstanding
any provision in the credit contract or at common law to the contrary, (or
where the agreement as a whole purports to deprive a common law right)55 —
in particular changes to the interest or fees payable,56 or the period of
repayment or the minimum amount payable;57 nor may the credit provider
unilaterally extend to the consumer increased credit facilities.58
These provisions are aimed at curbing both reckless and predatory lending,
by preventing consumers from being blind-sided by so-called loan interest
‘reset’ provisions (the practice by which consumers are enticed into entering
into loan contracts by virtue of low, fixed interest rates, which then later ‘reset’
to higher, floating rates, often at levels that are unaffordable); prevent credit
providers from being able to contract out of the provisions of the Act;59 and
prevent credit providers from continuing to extend credit to unsophisticated
consumers, until those consumers are over-indebted, and caught in a debt trap.
Both reset shock and poor risk assessment are specifically addressed by the
National Credit Act, and so should be viewed not just as a form of consumer
protection, but also as a potential bulwark against systemic threats to the
broader economy.60
There are at least four factors that can be identified [as causing the sub-prime
disaster, two of which were]: reset shock, [and] poor assessment of the risks by the
lending institution ...61
55
56
57
58
59
60

Ibid s 90(2)(c), as prescribed by the Minister under s 90(5).
Ibid ss 104 (1)(a)–(b).
Ibid ss 120 (1)(a)–(b).
Ibid ss 119(1)–(4).
Ibid ss 90 (2)(a)(i), (2)(b).
See also: Matina Stevis, ‘Unsecured Loans Beset South Africa’, The Wall Street Journal,
28 September 2014 <http://www.wsj.com/articles/unsecured-loans-beset-south-africa141194 9648> in which the author describes the unsecured debt market as a ‘subprime-loan
crisis for the country’.
61 Guy Debelle, ‘A Comparison of the US and Australian Housing Markets’ (Paper presented
at the Address to the Sub-prime Mortgage Meltdown Symposium, Adelaide, 16 May 2008)
8 <http://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2008/sp-ag-160508.html>.
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Moreover, these provisions — namely prohibitions on unilateral changes to
credit agreements — act as a break on a lender’s ability to force upon
consumers standard-form contracts, that may contain provisions which would
enable the lender to gain virtually unfettered power to change, vary or amend
provisions in the contract, as they see fit. Compare this with the position in,
for example, Australia, where standard-form contracts for financial services
are typical, and where the only fetter upon the unscrupulous use of this power
resides in the prohibitions on unfair contract terms contained in the Australian
Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth),62 and then only in
respect of contracts for the provision of financial services,63 where those
contracts meet the definition of ‘standard-form’.64 Consequently the emphasis
in the South African legislation is quite different from that of, for example,
Australia: in South Africa changes cannot be made unilaterally. In Australia
changes can be made unilaterally unless they can be proven to be unfair, and
only if they form part of a standard-form contract. Consequently consumer
policy is once again front and centre in the National Credit Act, with a clear
emphasis on placing the onus on the credit provider to prove they are in
compliance, not on the consumer to prove the credit provider is in breach.

B Research
A further, noteworthy aspect of the Act, is the manner in which it seeks to
shine a light onto debt practices in the Republic. In extreme cases, industries
have sought to outlaw research into the harmful effects of the products they
produce. One such example is the prohibition on the conduct of research into
deaths by gun violence in the United States.65 In contradistinction to such an
approach, the National Credit Act66 specifically requires the National Credit
Regulator (‘NCR’)67 to conduct research into socio-economic trends in
consumer credit in the Republic, especially as regards over-indebtedness, and
to make known its findings.68
These findings are contained in the NCR’s Annual Reports, and in research
commissioned by the NCR. They provide insights into educational
initiatives;69 trends in the credit market, such as increases in the use of
62 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) sub-div BA s 12BF
(‘Unfair terms of consumer contracts and small business contracts’).
63 Ibid.
64 See: Access Canberra Australian Capital Territory et al, Commonwealth of Australia, Unfair
Contract Terms: A Guide for Businesses and Legal Practitioners (March 2016) 21.
65 Todd C Frankel, ‘Why the CDC Still Isn’t Researching Gun Violence, Despite the Ban
Being Lifted Two Years Ago’, The Washington Post, 14 January 2015 <https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/storyline/wp/2015/01/14/why-the-cdc-still-isnt-researching-gunviolence-despite-the-ban-being-lifted-two-years-ago/>.
66 Section 16(1)(c).
67 National Credit Regulator, Home (2016) <http://www.ncr.org.za>.
68 National Credit Act ss 16(1)–(2).
69 National Credit Regulator, Annual Report 2011/2012 (2012) 13, 34–7; National
Credit
Regulator,
Annual
Report
2012/2013
(2013)
33–6;
National
Credit Regulator, Annual Report 2014, above n 6, 20–3; National Credit Regulator,
Annual Report 2014/2015 (2015) 19–20, 33; Nomsa Motshegare, ‘An Overview
of the NCR’s Research, Awareness & Education Activities as Part
of Executing Its Mandate’ (Paper presented at the International Conference
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unsecured credit;70 trends in the number of consumers with impaired credit
records;71 trends in the costs of credit;72 trends in the accessibility of credit;73
trends in alternative dispute resolution;74 trends in overall levels of debt;75
levels of household debt;76 distribution of debt by province;77 breakdowns of
indebtedness by income bracket;78 compliance trends;79 trends in respect of
debt counselling;80 trends in respect of complaints, investigations and
enforcement, including significant court decisions;81 and a statistical report on
the consumer credit market, tracking trends in consumer finance, issued
quarterly.82
Overall, research commissioned by the NCR has indicated various trends
since the enactment of the Act. For example, while there has been evidence of
improvements in access to credit,83 overall, access to credit remains

70
71

72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80

81

82
83

on Over-Indebtedness and Credit Regulation, Pretoria, South Africa, August 2010) 14
<http://www.up.ac.za/media/shared/Legacy/sitefiles/file/47/327/lawclinicdraftpapersfromcon
ference/nomsaslides.pdf>.
National Credit Regulator, Annual Report 2011/2012, above n 69, 14, 24; National Credit
Regulator, Annual Report 2012/2013, above n 69, 27; National Credit Regulator, Annual
Report 2014/2015, above n 69, 27; Motshegare, above n 69, 7.
National Credit Regulator, Annual Report 2011/2012, above n 69, 19, 20; National Credit
Regulator, Annual Report 2012/2013, above n 69, 30; National Credit Regulator, Annual
Report 2014, above n 6, 36–7; National Credit Regulator, Annual Report 2014/2015, above
n 69, 25; Motshegare, above n 69, 6.
National Credit Regulator, Annual Report 2011/2012, above n 69, 22; National Credit
Regulator, Annual Report 2014, above n 6, 38; Motshegare, above n 69, 4.
National Credit Regulator, Annual Report 2011/2012, above n 69, 22; National Credit
Regulator, Annual Report 2012/2013, above n 69, 32.
National Credit Regulator, Annual Report 2011/2012, above n 69, 22; National Credit
Regulator, Annual Report 2012/2013, above n 69, 23.
National Credit Regulator, Annual Report 2011/2012, above n 69, 24; National Credit
Regulator, Annual Report 2014, above n 6, 32–4.
National Credit Regulator, Annual Report 2011/2012, above n 69, 23.
Ibid 25; National Credit Regulator, Annual Report 2012/2013, above n 69, 28; National
Credit Regulator, Annual Report 2014, above n 6, 35.
National Credit Regulator, Annual Report 2011/2012, above n 69, 25; National Credit
Regulator, Annual Report 2012/2013, above n 69, 29; Motshegare, above n 69, 4.
National Credit Regulator, Annual Report 2011/2012, above n 69, 278; National Credit
Regulator, Annual Report 2014, above n 6, 19; National Credit Regulator, Annual Report
2014/2015, above n 69, 18, 30–1.
National Credit Regulator, Annual Report 2011/2012, above n 69, 29–31; National Credit
Regulator, Annual Report 2012/2013, above n 69, 15; National Credit Regulator, Annual
Report 2014, above n 6, 29–31; National Credit Regulator, Annual Report 2014/2015, above
n 69, 23–4; Motshegare, above n 69, 4; Kgomotso H Masilo and Edward Rankhumise, ‘The
Implementation of Debt Counselling: An Exploratory Study’ (2014) 12 Problems and
Perspectives in Management 334, 338.
National Credit Regulator, Annual Report 2011/2012, above n 69, 13, 31–4; National Credit
Regulator, Annual Report 2012/2013, above n 69, 16–22; National Credit Regulator, Annual
Report 2014, above n 6, 24–8, 40; National Credit Regulator, Annual Report 2014/2015,
above n 69, 21–2.
National Credit Regulator, Consumer Credit Market Report (CCMR) (2016)
<http://www.ncr.org.za/consumer-credit-market-report-ccmr>.
Penelope Hawkins, Pricing of and Access to Consumer Credit, Research Report Summary
(National Credit Regulator, June 2009) 2.
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persistently inadequate;84 anecdotal evidence suggesting that by capping
interest rates and fees, loans to smaller and higher-risk consumers may have
been discouraged, inhibiting access to credit by those consumers;85 more
expensive credit-granting processes due to the provisions of the Act, (but
potentially off-set against lower levels of bad debts);86 a decline in the cost of
credit across certain categories,87 particularly furniture finance;88 serious
inefficiencies and backlogs in debt counselling services;89 regulatory and
legislative shortcomings leading to, for example, a low number of those
consumers in need of debt review enjoying adjudication by the courts;90
reductions in average household debt,91 but persistent problems of financial
vulnerability among consumers;92 trends in the granting of unsecured credit;93
trends in respect of developmental credit;94 obstacles in practice surrounding
proof of recklessness;95 and a lack of transparency and price comparability for
consumers wishing to compare loans.96
There is evidence that, as at the time of the compilation of the report,97 the
increase in the number of consumers with impaired credit records had
increased by 426 000 year on year.98 Set against a total of 18,51 million
consumers of finance in the Republic, of which 8,61 million had impaired
credit records (47 per cent of total), an increase of almost half a million
consumers with impaired records, year on year, might be regarded by some as
evidence that there is already too much access to credit. It may be argued,
therefore, that greater access to credit, especially in respect of high-risk
microloans, facilitated by lower regulatory costs, would be to the
overwhelming benefit of the lenders, not the consumers.99 It seems intuitive
that increased loans by higher-risk micro-lenders, would return a higher
percentage of impaired records than the overall level of impaired records for
the entire consumer market. In light of the fact that the overall level of
84 Developmentnomics, Literature Review on the Impact of the National Credit Act (NCA) Has
Had (sic) on South Africa’s Credit Market, Final Report (National Credit Regulator, June
2012) 52.
85 Magauta Mphahlele, ‘South Africa’s Proposed Credit Regulations Irk Credit Providers,
Please Consumers’ on Center for Financial Inclusion Blog (15 July
2015) <https://cfi-blog.org/2015/07/15/south-africas-proposed-credit-regulations-irk-creditproviders-please-consumers/>.
86 Developmentnomics, above n 84, 34.
87 Hawkins, above n 83, 1.
88 Ibid 4.
89 National Credit Regulator, NCR Task Team on Debt Counselling, Briefing Note
(March 2010) 3–4; Melanie Roestoff et al, ‘The Debt Counselling Process — Closing the
Loopholes in the National Credit Act 34 of 2005’ (2009) 12 Potchefstroom Electronic Law
Journal/Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad 247, 247; Developmentnomics, above n 84,
45.
90 Roestoff et al, above n 89, 247; Developmentnomics, above n 84, 13.
91 Developmentnomics, above n 84, 62.
92 Ibid 19.
93 Ibid 58.
94 Ibid 106.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid 107.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid 108.
99 See also: Mphahlele, above n 85.
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impaired consumers is approaching 50 per cent, it would appear that the
argument could be made that current regulatory costs are not high enough,
much less too low.
Finally, there is evidence that some consumers are using the protection of
the Act to game the system, although evidence of the need to protect illiterate
and financially unsophisticated consumers, remains strong.100
The most recent figures quarter-on-quarter, as at March 2016, indicate that
the value of mortgages granted decreased by 16,45 per cent; secured credit
granted decreased by 18,22 per cent; unsecured credit agreements decreased
by 15, 97 per cent; credit facilities (consisting mainly of credit cards, store
cards and bank overdrafts) decreased by 4,72 per cent; short-term credit
decreased by 28,46 per cent; while developmental credit increased by 212,25
per cent.101

C Ambit
The National Credit Act previously regulated every type of entity that
extended credit: banks, micro-lenders, pawn brokers,102 furniture and clothing
retailers, entities both foreign and domestic, and organs of state.103 The only
exception was credit granted not at arm’s length, such as between family
members.104 Entities that extend credit, and which were captured by the
provisions of the Act, were required to register with the NCR.105 Indeed, the
only entities that extended credit, but were not required to register with the
NCR, were those with fewer than 100 loans in their portfolio — such as
‘stokvels’ — or those whose portfolios were worth less than ZAR 500 000.106
In South Africa, traditionally, black communities have assisted one another
through the provision of so-called ‘stokvel’ finance. Stokvels operate as
community savings clubs and are exempted from registration under the Act.107
Typically they have approximately 12 members or more, with each member
contributing to a central fund on a weekly, fortnightly or monthly basis.
Stokvels are virtually only utilised by low- or very low-income black South
Africans — and then predominantly by older black South Africans. Members
usually meet monthly at a party hosted by one of the members, and in return
for which the host may be expected to make a small profit. The central fund
is then loaned to each member, in turn, for anything from funeral expenses, the
purchase of groceries, to home improvements.108 There are currently
approximately 800 000 stokvels in South Africa, worth an estimated ZAR 45
billion, and with somewhere between 8, 6 and 9 million members. Most are
100 Developmentnomics, above n 84, 109.
101 National Credit Regulator, Consumer Credit Market Report (CCMR), First Quarter/March
2016, 1–2.
102 National Credit Act s 1; Renke, Roestoff and Haupt, above n 8, 232.
103 Renke, Roestoff and Haupt, above n 8, 236.
104 For an account of types of agreement not at arm’s length, see: ibid 237.
105 National Credit Regulator, Register of Registrants: Credit Providers (2016) <http://www.
ncr.org.za/register_of_registrants/registered_cp.php>.
106 National Credit Act s 40(1)(a).
107 Ibid s 8(2)(c).
108 ‘Stokvel’, Oxford Dictionaries (Oxford University Press, 2016) <http://www.oxforddic
tionaries.com/definition/english/stokvel>.
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represented by the National Stokvel Association of South Africa.109 Clearly
the legislator did not intend to cover stokvels, as registration for these
community savings clubs would be unduly onerous.
While entities other than stokvels, but which were below the threshold of
100 loans or ZAR 500 000 were previously not required to register with the
Regulator, they were nonetheless subject to the provisions of the Act in every
particular.
This led to conduct problems with small, unregistered moneylenders, who
argued that they were not subject to the provisions of the Act. As a result the
Act was amended,110 so that henceforth anyone who extends credit in an
amount in excess of the amount set by the Minister would have to register as
a credit provider. The Minister set this amount at nil ZAR,111 thereby
capturing anyone who extends credit to another person, where the credit
includes the repayment of any fees or interest.112 The only exception being
loans made not at arm’s length,113 such as between family members.
every person or entity that trades as a credit provider, even the smallest, illegal and
informal credit providers are encouraged to register ... regulate and monitor all credit
providers ... in order to promote responsible credit lending, to curb reckless credit
lending and reduce the over indebtedness of consumers ... registered credit providers
are prohibited from engaging in unconscionable and unscrupulous conduct, such as
the outright criminal practices often used by illegal and informal credit providers ...
This new threshold is an innovation in the industry that will largely contribute to an
equal playing field in the credit market. The threshold will increase legal and
responsible credit lending, which will in turn lead to broader financial inclusion ...114

A credit provider required to register in terms of the Act, but which does not
register, must not offer credit, and if it does so, any such credit agreements are
void from the date upon which they were entered into.115 In so doing, the
responsibility is placed squarely upon the providers of credit, which if they
fail to discharge, will leave them in a position of having no recourse against
the consumer.

D Enforcement of debts and contractual liability
The Act prohibits heavy-handed debt enforcement processes, no doubt aimed
at preventing debt collectors from frightening consumers into repayment. It is
109 National Stokvel Association of South Africa (‘NASASA’), Homepage (2016)
<http://nasasa.co.za/site/>; Gillian Jones, ‘A Stokvel by Any Other Name is Still
Empowering’, Business Day, 11 May 2015 <http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/financial/
2015/05/11/a-stokvel-by-any-other-name-is-still-empowering>.
110 National Credit Amendment Act 2014 s 10.
111 South Africa, Determination of a Threshold for Credit Provider Registration, Government
Notices, Gazette, No 39981, 11 May 2016, 5, [2].
112 National Credit Act s 8(3)(b).
113 Ibid s 4(1)–(2).
114 Sidwell Medupe, Minister Davies Determines a New Threshold for Credit Provider
Registration (Department of Trade and Industry, 25 May 2016) <https://www.thedti.
gov.za/editmedia.jsp?id=3743>.
115 National Credit Act s 40(4). See also: Matthew Thomson, Am I Required to Register as a
Credit Provider? Recent Changes to the National Credit Act and Regulations (21 June 2016)
Dingley Marshall <http://www.dingleymarshall.co.za/am-i-required-to-register-as-a-creditprovider/>.
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suggested that while this is not aimed at achieving anything more than
addressing the ‘how’ of the debt-collection process, as opposed to the ‘when’
or the ‘if’, it is nonetheless an important provision aimed at civilising the
process and protecting consumers from intimidation. Put differently, if a
consumer can be forced to repay their debts, good and well, but they should
not, in the process of being subjected to debt collection, be terrorised.116
The Act ousts the parol evidence rule in favour of the consumer, by
preventing credit providers from contractually escaping from any
representations made prior to the commencement of the contract, which may
have induced the contract.117 Moreover, the Act seeks to address inadequate
consumer redress and dispute resolution, and even poor customer service.118

E Access to credit
In terms of access to credit — an important feature in a developing economy
where a sizeable portion of the population has historically not enjoyed
equality of access to credit — an applicant is, by law, assured that they will
be granted any credit they apply for, unless there are legitimate reasons for a
refusal.119 The Act does this by granting every person the right to apply for
credit,120 and requires that credit only be refused on reasonable commercial
grounds.121 The Act does not establish a right to require a credit provider to
enter into a credit agreement, but merely that no discrimination takes place in
the provision of credit.122 This prohibition on discrimination must, according
to the Act, be read with the objects and purport of the Constitution,123 (which
prohibits discrimination based upon ‘race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital
status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability,
religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth’), and with the
provisions of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair
Discrimination Act. The relevant provisions are contained in ch 2 of the
Act,124 which deal with the ‘Prevention, Prohibition and Elimination of Unfair
Discrimination, Hate Speech and Harassment’, and within ch 2, by s 6, which
is a ‘Prevention and general prohibition of unfair discrimination’; s 7, which
is a ‘Prohibition of unfair discrimination on ground of race’; s 8, which is a
‘Prohibition of unfair discrimination on ground of gender’; s 9, which is a
‘Prohibition of unfair discrimination on ground of disability’; s 11, which is
116 See, eg, National Credit Act s 133 (‘Prohibited collection and enforcement practices’).
Compare the position in the United States where, in 2015, the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau ‘received more than 85, 200 complaints about debt collection, making it
by far the largest source of consumer grievances among the sectors it watches over’. Yuka
Hayashi, ‘CFPB Unveils Overhaul of Debt Collection’, The Wall Street Journal, 28 July
2016 <http://www.wsj.com/articles/cfpb-unveils-overhaul-of-debt-collection-1469678460>.
117 National Credit Act s 90(2)(h)(i).
118 Solli-Hubbard, above n 3, 72.
119 Ibid.
120 National Credit Act s 60(1).
121 Ibid s 60(2).
122 Ibid s 60(3).
123 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (South Africa) s 9(3).
124 Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 2000 (South Africa)
ch 2.
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a ‘Prohibition of harassment’; and s 12, which is a ‘Prohibition of
dissemination and publication of unfair discriminatory information that
unfairly discriminates’.
These prohibitions against unfair and discriminatory treatment under
s 61(1)125 extend to and include: assessing the consumer’s credit
worthiness;126 acceding to an application for credit;127 any aspect of the costs
involved;128 any of the terms or conditions;129 assessing or requiring
compliance with any aspect of a credit agreement;130 exercising any of the
credit provider’s rights;131 ‘determining whether to continue, enforce, seek
judgment in respect of, or terminate a credit agreement’;132 or reporting any
consumer’s record.133 Where an application does result in a refusal, the
applicant has a right to know the reasons.134 This is an important provision,
because credit providers will need to be accurate and circumspect in the
reasons they provide. If the reasons are inadequate or unreasonable, then that
would form the basis for a review of the provider’s decision. Put differently,
the credit provider cannot provide generic reasons by way of a form letter. The
provider would need to demonstrate a reasonable measure of engagement with
the applicant’s circumstances. Furthermore, the provider will not be able to
rely on reasons, other than the reasons provided to the applicant, and so will
be compelled to provide reasons which are, to the best of the ability of the
provider, complete and comprehensive.
Credit granters are obligated to ensure, not only that consumers can afford
the credit, but also that they understand the costs and risks associated with that
credit.135

F The ‘Marikana’ connection
Despite these provisions, however, the Act has failed to completely remove
the scourge of unsecured, predatory loans. Indeed, unsecured loans in South
Africa have become the biggest growth market for the four major South
African banks.136 In at least one instance, the reckless provision of loans, in
a manner that many have argued was predatory, resulted in social conditions
that ultimately gave rise to a massacre at the hands of the South African
Police. As Bateman states:
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136

National Credit Act.
Ibid s 61(1)(a).
Ibid s 61(1)(b).
Ibid s 61(1)(c).
Ibid s 61(1)(d).
Ibid s 61(1)(e).
Ibid s 61(1)(f).
Ibid s 61(1)(g).
Ibid s 61(1)(h).
Solli-Hubbard, above n 3, 72.
Ibid.
Stuart Theobald, The Risk of Unsecured Lending in South Africa, Occasional Research
Report (10 June 2013) 7. For more on the dangers of sub-prime (or microcredit as it is also
known), and the devastation caused by the extension of sub-prime loans to the poorest of the
poor in ‘Bolivia, Bosnia, Pakistan, Nicaragua, Morocco and most catastrophically, in Andhra
Pradesh State in India, site of 250 000 suicides by indebted farmers’, see: Bateman,
‘Microcredit and Marikana’, above n 15, 2.
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we have perhaps just witnessed one of the most appalling microcredit-related
disasters of all in South Africa. Extreme over-indebtedness by workers apparently
helped precipitate the Marikana massacre on August 16 [2012]. Miners employed at
Lonmin’s mine were gradually seduced by local lending institutions into accessing
far too much microcredit.137
With far too many miners apparently forced into spending more on interest
payments each week ... no matter how hard they tried, they simply could not prise
themselves away from taking out a microcredit in advance of payday ... The miners’
desperation and anger was palpable, Lonmin refused to back down, and a massacre
ensued [when South African Police Services members shot striking miners].138

IV Specific provisions
This part provides an account and an analysis of specific provisions in the
National Credit Act, which deserve particular attention. Only those sections
which, in this writer’s view, deserve attention, and which demonstrate
consumer protection principles, are repeated here.

A Section 64: Right to information in plain and
understandable language
South Africa has developed an admirable focus139 on plain language,
concomitant with its progression to a democratic political dispensation in
1994. Examples include both South Africa’s Final Constitution,140 and the
Interim Constitution141 which preceded it, and the Consumer Protection
Act.142 In a country with a large proportion of the population ill-educated and
in some instances illiterate, it serves to strengthen the position of vulnerable
consumers, by making legislation as accessible as possible. This is not only
true for South Africa; it would be true for any country where consumers, made
vulnerable by, for example, their lack of language skills, are present.
Again, as is a general feature of this Act, the onus is upon the producer of
the document or contract to ensure that it is in plain language, and again, as
is also a feature of this Act, a court or tribunal is given philosophical direction,
in terms of reaching a conclusion as to compliance with the Act, but is
specifically mandated to inquire into the particular circumstances of a
consumer, upon whose behalf a complaint is brought.
In so doing the Act references ‘consumer of the class of persons for whom
the document is intended’.143 Set against that must be the expected ability of
a consumer with average literacy skills, but minimal credit experience, to
understand that document, without undue effort. In particular a court or
137 Bateman, ‘Microcredit and Marikana’, above n 15, 2.
138 Ibid 3.
139 See, eg, Plain Language Institute, Plain Language Legislation in SA (2010)
<http://www.plainlanguageinstitute.co.za/context.php>.
140 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (South Africa).
141 Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1993 (South Africa).
142 Consumer Protection Act 2008 (South Africa).
143 National Credit Act s 64(2).
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tribunal must have regard to the vocabulary and sentence structure used in the
contract.144
It is not in dispute that this creates a large leeway for courts and tribunals.
But in the context of heavily skewed power relations between credit providers,
and a potentially vulnerable consumer, the Act clearly aims to favour the latter.
As a corollary, it is incumbent upon credit providers to know their customers
(‘KYC’), and to err on the side of caution in the formulation and provision of
documentation.

B Section 66: Protection of consumer credit rights
This section serves to outlaw any attempts by a credit provider to punish a
consumer for exercising their rights, or to punish another party to the
agreement (such as a guarantor). It prevents a credit provider from installing
into a contract any provisions which would allow some sort of sanction to be
imposed upon a consumer who exercises their rights, or complains about their
treatment. This is a valuable provision, in that it prevents credit providers from
bullying or coercing consumers. It is also useful, as part of a wider effort, to
combat predatory lending.

C Section 76: Advertising practices
The effect of this section is, principally, to outlaw advertisements or
promotional materials that are designed to, or have the effect of misleading or
deceiving consumers, or are fraudulent or illegal, and which fail to inform
consumers of the costs of a particular form of credit.
Such a provision is clearly aimed at curbing predatory lending. Where it can
be shown that a credit provider breached this section, the consumer may seek
to have their indebtedness made void. This not only places the onus squarely
on the shoulders of the lender, but also the risk: if a lender can be shown to
have extended credit to a class of persons in breach of this or other sections,
they may face a ruling from a court or tribunal which would render void the
indebtedness of a whole class of consumers. That in turn may cause the
collapse of the lender.

D Section 80: Reckless credit
This section defines credit to be reckless where the granting of such credit
would leave the consumer over-indebted.
It placed upon the credit provider an obligation to ‘know their customer’.
Moreover, the credit provider was to be judged according to what information
was available at the time the decision to grant credit was made. This was
potentially different from the information which the credit provider actually
obtained. Thus a failure to make a reasonable investigation of the potential
consumer’s position, and a concomitant lack of adequacy of information
obtained would not, it is suggested, have constituted a defence. The Act
attempted therefore to provide an incentive for the credit provider to make a
thorough investigation.
144 These issues were addressed by the High Court of South Africa in Standard Bank of South
Africa Ltd v Dlamini [2013] 1 SA 219 [52]–[53], [64].
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Nonetheless, credit providers were attempting to evade responsibility for
granting credit recklessly, by blaming the consumer for the inadequate
provision of information. The information that a credit provider is required to
ascertain has, therefore, now been specified in later regulatory amendments,145
and is compulsory.146 These ‘Affordability Assessments’ require a credit
provider to ascertain, at a minimum, and subject to certain exceptions (such as
pawn transactions, school or student loans, developmental credit, public
interest credit agreements, emergency loans, temporary increases under
existing credit agreements, incidental credit and the like)147 the consumer’s
existing financial means and prospects and existing financial obligations.148 It
must do so by requiring from the consumer:
(i) three payslips or bank statements indicating three salary deposits;149
or
(ii) for consumers who do not receive a salary, three instances of
documentary proof of income or three months of bank statements;150
or
(iii) for consumers who are not formally employed, three months of bank
statements or their latest financial statement;151
(iv) where there is a material variance in pay, the provider must average
out the gross income over the preceding 3-pay periods;152
(v) the consumer must accurately disclose all of their obligations;153
(vi) the consumer must submit ‘authentic’ documentation;154
(vii) the provider must take into account other sources of income and,
where appropriate, joint household income,155 as well as ‘existing
financial means, prospects and obligations’;156
(viii) the credit provider must utilise the expense norms table, contained in
the regulations,157 which provide as follows:158

145 South Africa, Government Notices, Gazette, No 38557, Regulation Gazette, No 10382,
13 March 2015 <http://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/NCA-amendment-RegulationsMarch -20151.pdf>.
146 Sidwell Medupe, The DTI Publishes Affordability Assessment Regulations for Public
Comment (Department of Trade and Industry, 5 August 2014) <https://www.thedti.gov.za
/editmedia.jsp?id=3104>.
147 South Africa, Government Notices, above n 145, ch 3, s 2.
148 Angelique Arde, ‘New Plans to Tighten Your Access to Credit’, Independent Online,
10 August 2014 <http://www.iol.co.za/business/personal-finance/new-plans-to-tighten-youraccess-to-credit-1732819>.
149 South Africa, Government Notices, above n 145, s 4(a).
150 Ibid s 4(b).
151 Ibid s 4(c).
152 South Africa, Government Notices, above n 145, s 5.
153 Ibid s 6.
154 Ibid s 7.
155 National Credit Act s 78(3).
156 Ibid s 81(2)(a)(iii).
157 South Africa, Government Notices, above n 145, s 9.
158 Ibid 19.

JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 87 SESS: 5 OUTPUT: Wed May 10 21:08:23 2017
/journals/journal/cclj/vol24pt3/part_3

A statutory analysis of South Africa’s National Credit Act

237

(ix) the credit provider must utilise the following methodology: ascertain gross
income; include statutory deductions and minimum living expenses to arrive
at net income, to be set against payment of debt instalments; and calculate
discretionary income to satisfy repayments of new debts after existing debts
are taken into account;159
(x) the credit provider must take into account the consumer’s debt repayment
history.160
Where what constitutes the reckless granting of credit has been the subject of litigation,
courts and tribunals have asserted that there is no hard and fast rule as to the provision
of information to prove recklessness.161
Once again, in setting out a list of information that should have been provided, I do
not wish to be prescriptive or to lay down a law of the Medes and the Persians. It
may be that a Defendant does not have to go as far as I have suggested in the
previous paragraph.162

Instead, courts have stated that a party seeking a court to exercise its discretion
— and it is a discretion — in terms of s 80, must place as much information
before the court as possible, in order to persuade the court to exercise that
discretion.163
The mere submission or even proof of over-indebtedness does not place a mandatory
duty on the court to make an order in favour of the consumer and merely opens the
door for the court to use its discretion.164
159 Ibid s 10.
160 Ibid s 13.
161 SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Mbatha; SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Molete;
SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Makhoba [2011] 1 SA 310 (GSJ) [56]. See also: Liphoko
v ABSA Bank Ltd [2010] ZANCT 10 [4.2].
162 SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Mbatha; SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Molete;
SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Makhoba [2011] 1 SA 310 (GSJ) [69].
163 Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Hales [2009] 3 SA 315 (D) [12]. See also: Mareesa
Kreuser, ‘The Application of Section 85 of the National Credit Act in an Application for
Summary Judgment’ (2012) 45 De Jure 1, 15.
164 Kreuser, above n 163, paraphrasing Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Hales [2009] 3 SA
315 (D) [13].
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Wisely, however, a loan from a pawn broker is an exception. For example,
these agreements are not subject to the prohibitions on reckless lending.165
This provision is particularly insightful, because a loan from a pawn broker is
set-off against movable property, which the creditor ‘pawns’, on the
understanding that if the loan is not repaid, the property will be forfeited.
Thus, collateral is provided, and if the consumer cannot repay, then the
collateral is lost to the consumer, but nothing more. Put differently, loans from
a pawn broker, where the consumer provides collateral, will not lead to a spiral
of indebtedness. Moreover, individuals who pawn property are often in such
a perilous financial position that loans to them would often, if not almost
always, be categorised as ‘reckless’. The combination of financial desperation
and fixed collateral is thus rightly, in this writer’s view, regarded as more
important than the prohibition on reckless lending, which if enforced would
prevent the consumer from being able to pawn their property.

E Section 82: Assessment mechanisms and procedures
This section allowed the credit provider to develop its own evaluative
mechanisms, models or procedures to enable it to conduct the
creditworthiness and suitability assessment, as was required above; provided
the mechanisms that the credit provider develops are fair and objective. A
credit provider may submit its mechanisms, models or procedures to the
regulator, for pre-approval.
The National Consumer Tribunal (‘NCT’), on the recommendation of the
NCR, may impose mandatory guidelines on a credit provider who is
consistently found to use evaluative mechanisms or procedures that are unfair
and subjective. Put differently, this empowers a tribunal to punish and impose
conditions upon credit providers who have a track record of acting contrary to
the spirit or the letter of the Act. Given time and sufficient opportunities for
ventilation, this stricture may have a civilising effect on the industry as a
whole, and may contribute to the development of a culture that favours
prudent, ethical conduct towards consumers, by rendering contrary business
practices unsustainable.
Subject to s 82(3), the NCR may publish guidelines for assessment
mechanisms and procedures by credit companies. While the guidelines which
the NCR may publish are not binding, the fact that a tribunal may
subsequently impose them as binding, by way of an order, makes the
guidelines highly persuasive. For one thing, following the guidelines as
published could later be used by a credit provider to convince a tribunal that
it has a clean track record. This may prove useful, because a determination by
a tribunal that a credit provider does not have a clean track record opens up
the possibility that the tribunal may impose other processes as binding, in
addition to the guidelines as promulgated by the NCR.
165 National Credit Act s 78(2).
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F Section 83: Court may suspend reckless credit
agreement166
This section effectively provides courts with unfettered discretion to apply the
prohibitions on reckless lending. This includes the power to set aside a loan
contract, despite the prima facie validity thereof in terms of the common law
or statute, or a contractual provision. In making the determination the court
need only have regard to what it determines to be just and reasonable grounds,
and with reference to the provisions prescribed by s 80(1) (see above).
This section has the effect of making reckless lending a precarious business
for the credit provider: while the credit provider may initially succeed in
extending reckless loans, the credit provider is effectively denied of any
certainty of title. If at a later stage either the consumer or the NCR forms the
view that the loan was reckless, it may then be challenged, and all of the
consumer’s obligations rendered void. This serves as a powerful disincentive
to credit providers to ‘chance their luck’.
Put differently, if the court finds the loan reckless, it can set aside all or part
of the consumer’s obligations. In effect, therefore, the court can punish a
lender under this section, for making a reckless loan, by voiding all or part of
the loan, leaving the lender with no further recourse. The flexibility given to
the court, by which it can suspend ‘all or part’ of the obligations, according to
whatever is ‘just and reasonable’, is particularly noteworthy.

G Section 85: Court may declare and relieve
over-indebtedness (read with s 127: Surrender of goods
and s 128: Compensation for consumer)
Similar to s 83, this section allows a court to inquire into whether a consumer
is over-indebted, notwithstanding a provision in the loan contract, or at
common law or statute, that purports to deprive the consumer of the right to
be relieved of their debt if they are found to be over-indebted.167 Clearly,
therefore, the legislator has placed the onus to ‘know your customer’ on the
credit provider, while at the same time firing a shot across credit providers’
bows, to the effect that if they engage in reckless lending, whereby a consumer
is placed in an inescapable debt trap, then responsibility will rest with the
credit provider, as indeed will the consequences. In order for a consumer to
convince a court that they are over-indebted, the following requirements
would have to be met, in terms of evidence of the consumer’s financial
position:
166 Subsequently amended by National Credit Amendment Act 2014 (South Africa) s 25, in
which jurisdiction is extended to include tribunals.
167 For more, see: J Otto, ‘Recent Decisions under the National Credit Act 34 of 2005’ (2012)
Northernlaw Newsletter 1, 2 <http://www.northernlaw.co.za/important_information_for_
members/articles_by_prof_j_otto_on_ncr/MAY_2012_REPORTS.pdf> and the decision in
Andrews v Nedbank Ltd [2012] 3 SA 82 (ECG) [19].
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an outline of each Defendant’s assets and liabilities, income and expenditure
sufficient to enable the Court to ascertain whether the allegation of
over-indebtedness is bona fide ...168

In the event that a court finds that credit has been extended in a manner that
is reckless, it may rearrange the consumer’s obligations, including by
recalculating those obligations,169 which may include holding that the credit
agreement is void ab initio;170 requiring the credit provider to refund the
consumer, with interest;171 or it may cancel all of the creditor’s rights to
recover monies or goods;172 or it may cause the creditor’s rights to recover to
be forfeited to the State.173
If the consumer has a valid complaint that, but for the recklessness of the credit
provider, the consumer would never have become involved in the credit transaction,
it might be ‘just and reasonable’ to ‘set aside’ the agreement. In that event, the
agreement would be null and void and as if it had never been. As a consequence, the
credit provider, who remains the owner of the vehicle, would be entitled to
restoration of the vehicle. On the other hand, the consumer, who no longer has any
obligations under the agreement that has been set aside would be relieved of any
further indebtedness or deficiency claim under the agreement. In certain
circumstances, this would be a fair and symmetrical resolution.174

In determining an outcome under s 85, courts will examine whether the
consumer has surrendered the goods under 127175 for sale, subject to the fair
price provisions of s 128.176 A consumer is not required to surrender the goods
according to s 127, but where a consumer has retained the goods, it is less
likely they will come under the protection of s 85.177 Furthermore, courts will
take a dim view of an application under s 85, where the consumer has failed
to take steps to resolve the dispute, after receiving notice under s 129(1)(a).178
In any event my view is that the NCA does not envisage that a consumer may claim
to be over-indebted whilst at the same time retaining possession of the goods which
form the subject matter of the agreement. Such goods should be sold to reduce the
defendant’s indebtedness.179
168 SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Mbatha; SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Molete;
SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Makhoba [2011] 1 SA 310 (GSJ) [68(1)].
169 National Credit Act s 86(7)(c)(ii)(dd).
170 Ibid s 89(5)(a).
171 Ibid s 89(5)(b).
172 Ibid s 89(5)(c)(i).
173 Ibid s 89(5)(c)(ii).
174 SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Mbatha; SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Molete;
SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Makhoba [2011] 1 SA 310 (GSJ) [46].
175 National Credit Act.
176 Ibid.
177 Ibid. See further the provisions of s 130(1), ibid; SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Mbatha;
SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Molete; SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Makhoba [2011]
1 SA 310 (GSJ) [49].
178 National Credit Act; FirstRand Bank Ltd v Olivier [2008] JOL 22139 (SE) [14]–[15]. See
also: Kreuser, above n 163, 13.
179 Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Panayiotts [2009] ZAGPHC 22 [77] (Masipa J) and cited with
approval in SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Mbatha; SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v
Molete; SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Makhoba [2011] 1 SA 310 (GSJ) [48]. See also:
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It seems unlikely that the legislature ever intended that the consumer could keep the
‘money and the box’.180

One further consequence of s 127181 is that it gives the consumer an
‘extraordinary right’ to escape from a credit agreement whenever there are
goods involved, by unilaterally deciding to return the goods to the credit
provider, so that they can be sold.182 The consumer will, however, run the risk
that the sale of the goods will not cover the debt, and where that is so, the
consumer will still be liable to the lender for the balance. Section 128183
provides a range of protections to the consumer, to ensure that the goods are
sold at ‘the best price reasonably attainable’.184 If the credit provider fails in
this regard, a tribunal may order that it pay an additional amount, exceeding
the sale proceeds, to the consumer.185 The better view is that ‘goods’ here refer
to movable property.186
Because a creditor must demonstrate that it complied with the Act in terms
of ‘know your customer’ at the time when credit was extended, any credit
extended after the point where the consumer would henceforth become
over-indebted, whether by one or multiple creditors, would be liable to be
deemed reckless. Put differently, where a consumer has been left
over-indebted by multiple creditors, it would be open to the consumer to
attack all or any of the creditors who extended credit to the consumer in a
manner that was reckless.

H Section 90: Unlawful provisions of credit agreement
This section contains some of the most far-reaching consumer protection
provisions of the Act aimed at curbing predatory lending, by declaring a
variety of potential contractual terms unlawful. These include provisions,
which in the view of the court, attack the spirit of the Act, or subject the
consumer to deceptive or fraudulent provisions. The section extends to
provisions in contracts that waive or exclude the consumer’s rights or the
provider’s obligations.

180
181
182

183
184
185

186

Corlia van Heerden, ‘Section 85 of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005: Thoughts on its
Scope and Nature’ (2013) 46 De Jure 968, 985.
SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Mbatha; SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Molete;
SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Makhoba [2011] 1 SA 310 (GSJ) [45].
National Credit Act.
Hermie Coetzee, ‘Voluntary Surrender, Repossession and Re-Instatement in Terms of the
National Credit Act 34 of 2005’ (2010) 73 Journal of Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law 569,
572; Bentley Credit Control and Bentley Attorneys, Voluntary Surrender of Goods —
Section 127 of the NCA (11 September 2009) creditmanagement.co.za <http://www.
creditmanagement.co.za/voluntary-surrender-of-goods-section-127-of-the-nca/>.
National Credit Act.
Ibid s 128(2).
Ibid. See judgment in: Dumas v Motor Finance Corporation [2008] ZANCT 2.
See also: Tanya Woker, ‘A Critical Examination of the Role that the
National Consumer Tribunal Plays in Debt Relief with Suggestions for
Reform’ (Paper presented at the International Conference on Over-Indebtedness
and
Credit
Regulation,
Pretoria,
South
Africa,
August
2010)
9
<http://www.up.ac.za/media/shared/Legacy/sitefiles/file/47/327/lawclinicdraftpapersfromcon
ference/tanyawokerdraft.pdf>.
Coetzee, above n 182, 572.
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Further, the section makes unlawful any provisions that exempt conduct on
behalf of an agent of the provider, or excludes liability for any representations
that may have induced the contract. It prevents a provider from contractually
acquiring the right to repossess any goods, by entering the consumer’s
premises without, it is assumed, a court order.
Significantly, it also prevents a provider from nominating, as a forum, a
Division of the High Court of South Africa, when a Magistrate’s Court will do.
This, it is argued, is aimed at preventing a creditor from intimidating a
consumer, by selecting a court where the processes are more onerous, and the
costs considerably higher. In addition, the creditor cannot select a jurisdiction
which is remote from where the consumer resides, in order to make attendance
at court more difficult or onerous for the consumer.
The section also prevents the creditor from forcing the consumer to agree
to a garnishee order,187 that is to say, an order in which the consumer agrees
to give the creditor access to the consumer’s salary before it is paid.188 Finally,
the section prohibits recourse by the creditor to punitive interest rates.
Where an agreement contains an unlawful provision, that provision will be
void ab initio, and the court is empowered to sever that provision from the
agreement. If the provision cannot be severed, then the court may declare the
contract void from inception, and make any other orders that the court deems
fair and reasonable under the circumstances.

V Enforcement
A Statutory enforcement bodies
Section 12189 establishes the NCR. Section 13190 invests the NCR with
responsibility to create a ‘fair, transparent, competitive, sustainable,
responsible, efficient, effective and accessible credit market and industry’,
specifically to serve the needs of those consumers who were historically
disadvantaged by racial discrimination under Apartheid; low income
consumers and low income communities; and consumers who reside in
remote, isolated or low population density regions.
Under s 15 of the Act,191 the NCR is given responsibility for enforcement
by, inter alia, receiving complaints of alleged contraventions;192 monitoring
the consumer credit market with a view to preventing contraventions, or
detecting and prosecuting same;193 issuing and enforcing compliance
notices;194 conducting investigations;195 referring anti-competitive behaviour
187 For more on the abuse and corruption of these orders, see: Theobald, above n 136.
188 For more on this see: Angelique Arde, ‘Garnishee Orders: Are You Exploited?’, Independent
Online, 28 October 2012 <http://beta.iol.co.za/business/personal-finance/garnishee-ordersare-you-exploited-1412226>; Franciscus Haupt et al, The Incidence of and the Undesirable
Practices Relating to Garnishee Orders in South Africa (University of Pretoria, 2008).
189 National Credit Act.
190 Ibid.
191 Ibid.
192 Ibid s 15(b).
193 Ibid s 15(c).
194 Ibid s 15(e).
195 Ibid s 15(f).

JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 93 SESS: 5 OUTPUT: Wed May 10 21:08:23 2017
/journals/journal/cclj/vol24pt3/part_3

A statutory analysis of South Africa’s National Credit Act

243

to the Competition Commission;196 referring matters to the tribunal;197 or
accepting referrals from the tribunal.198
Section 26199 establishes the NCT, which may adjudicate any application in
terms of the Act, or make any order provided for in the Act. It may also
adjudicate in relation to any allegations of prohibited conduct, and impose a
remedy provided for in the Act.200
The Act establishes jurisdiction for both courts and tribunals; the latter
partly to expedite judicial review without relying on over-burdened courts.201
Tribunals are tasked with tackling prohibited conduct,202 as defined by the
Act, whereas courts are tasked with punishing offences.203 Generally
speaking, offences are more serious in nature,204 and involve intention (‘mens
rea’), whereas prohibited conduct, or a failure to comply with required
conduct, is covered by a penalty regime involving administrative fines,205 and
does not require the element of intention.206 These fines are capped at 10 per
cent of the respondent’s annual turnover during the previous financial year, or
ZAR 100 000, whichever is greater.207
In the event that an offence is committed, the Act sets out potential
punishments.208 Where the offence involves a failure to comply with an order
from a Tribunal to remedy a form of prohibited conduct, the punishment may
involve a fine, or imprisonment of up to ten years, or both.209 For any other
contravention that constitutes an offence, the punishment may be a fine, or
imprisonment not exceeding 12 months, or both.210
The South African penalty regime under the Act derives its concept of civil
penalties for prohibited conduct from the Australian model,211 and reserves
criminal prosecutions only for the most serious contraventions.212

196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212

National Credit Act s 15(h).
Ibid s 15(i).
Ibid s 15(h).
Ibid.
Ibid s 27. See also ss 142–8, dealing with tribunal consideration of complaints, applications
and referrals and ss 149–52, dealing with tribunal orders.
Ruth Goodwin-Groen, The National Credit Act and its Regulations in the Context of Access
to Finance in South Africa (FinMark Trust South Africa, November 2006) 61 [5.6.1].
Solli-Hubbard, above n 3, 77.
Ibid.
See: National Credit Regulator v Season Star Trading 333 CC [2013] ANCT 41 (NCT) [32]
citing with approval Re Competition Commission (South Africa) [2003] ZACT 43 [99].
National Credit Act s 151.
National Credit Regulator v Season Star Trading 333 CC [2013] ANCT 41 (NCT)
[39]–[40].
National Credit Act s 151(2).
Ibid s 161.
Ibid s 161(a).
Ibid s 161(b).
National Credit Regulator v Season Star Trading 333 CC [2013] ANCT 41 (NCT) [33].
Ibid. See also: Vicky Comino, ‘Effective Regulation by the Australian Securities and
Investments Commission: The Civil Penalty Problem’ (2009) 33 Melbourne University Law
Review 802, 804 n 8.
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B Specific enforcement provisions and penalties
A judicial officer (judge or magistrate) may order that premises be searched213
where the commission of a breach is suspected, and when searched, powers of
search and seizure of both persons and evidence are comprehensive.214
Juxtaposed with this power is a requirement215 that persons being searched are
entitled to their dignity (including that they not be physically searched by an
officer of a different gender),216 freedom, security and privacy;217 that the
search be conducted with regard to decency and order, and that persons
present be advised of their right to legal representation,218 which they may
insist be present during the search.219 Items over which the persons being
searched assert privilege may not be searched,220 but can be seized, pending
a court determination as to whether they should be regarded as privileged.221
Throughout this process inspectors may use reasonable force against persons
or property.222
The Act includes the power to summon witnesses,223 as well as the power
to compel a witness to be sworn in,224 or produce a book or document225 when
ordered to do so. Similarly, the Act226 makes it an offence to refuse to answer
a question fully or to the best of the witness’ ability,227 subject to the
provisions of s 139(5), which states that a self-incriminating answer provided
under s 159(a) cannot be used in criminal proceedings against the witness,
except on a charge of perjury. In this writer’s view this strikes a sensible
balance: individuals who have, or who are connected with entities that have
engaged in reckless or predatory lending, cannot stymie a court from
uncovering the truth, but at the same time will not be forced to
self-incriminate.
Section 160228 makes it an offence to ignore an order of a tribunal
(punishable by a fine or up to ten years imprisonment, or both),229 obstruct an
investigation, engage in a personal attack on a member of a tribunal, provide
false information to a tribunal, or ignore a search warrant (punishable by a fine
or up to 12 months’ imprisonment, or both).230 Under s 151231 a tribunal may
impose administrative penalties that amount to up to 10 per cent of the
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231

National Credit Act s 153.
Ibid s 154.
Ibid s 155.
Ibid s 155(2).
Ibid s 155(1).
Ibid s 155(3)(a).
Ibid s 155(3)(b).
Ibid s 155(5).
Ibid s 155(6).
Ibid s 155(7).
Ibid s 158(a).
Ibid s 158(b)(i).
Ibid s 158(b)(ii).
Ibid s 159.
Ibid sub-s (a).
Ibid.
Ibid s 161(a).
Ibid s 161(b).
Ibid.
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respondent’s turnover during the preceding year,232 or ZAR 100 000,233
whichever is greater. In determining the administrative penalty, the tribunal is
authorised to take account of a broad range of factors that relate to the gravity,
extent and duration of the offence,234 the loss or damage caused by the
offence,235 the behaviour of the respondent,236 the market circumstances
surrounding the contravention,237 the profit earned through the
contravention,238 the level of co-operation which the respondent provided to
the NCR,239 or whether the respondent has previous convictions for
contravening the Act.240 This allows courts to identify recidivist lenders, and
to increase penalties where a pattern of misconduct can be identified. Bad
apples can, potentially therefore, be removed from the industry. However, as
identified below, this has met with mixed results.
Recently the NCR has taken steps against a number of lenders for reckless
lending.241 In the aftermath of the fine levied against African Bank, and
African Bank’s subsequent collapse, other micro-lenders have, or are as at the
time of writing, being taken to task. These include Shoprite Holdings Ltd and
Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd.242 This is commendable, but at least in the case
of African Bank, is a case of closing the stable door after the horse had bolted.
But there’s a nasty taste to this rescue. Bloomberg reports that African Bank charged
borrowers rates as high as 5% PER MONTH. So not only was ABIL [African Bank
Investment Ltd, which was the parent company to African Bank] able to keep its
retailer alive by providing loans to the poor so they could buy furniture they couldn’t
afford, it also fleeced them on interest rates. You would think that such a bank should
be allowed to fail, wouldn’t you? Not a bit of it. According to Bloomberg, the central
bank’s reason for rescuing it was to ensure that the poor could continue to borrow.
The South African central bank and government between them have bailed out a
predatory lender.243

The lesson to be learned from this failure, by observers in other jurisdictions,
is that while the South African legislation is far-reaching, insightful, and
consumer-centric, without being draconian, the legislation is merely the
framework, and framework alone is not enough. Implementation must be
concerted and enforcement must be rigorous. Indeed, on the available
evidence, it appears that the NCR is late to a party in which microcredit
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241

National Credit Act s 151(2)(a).
Ibid s 151(2)(b).
Ibid s 151(3)(a).
Ibid s 151(3)(b).
Ibid s 151(3)(c).
Ibid s 151(3)(d).
Ibid s 151(3)(e).
Ibid s 151(3)(f).
Ibid s 151(3)(g).
Renee Bonorchis, ‘African Bank’s Ellerine Faces Closing as Buyers Stay Away’,
Bloomberg, 4 November 2014 <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201-11-04/afri
can-bank-s-ellerine-faces-closing-as-buyers-stay-away>.
242 Renee Bonorchis, ‘Shoprite Probed for Reckless Lending by S African Regulator’,
Bloomberg Business, 14 October 2015 <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-1014/shoprite-probed-for-reckless-lending-by-south-african-regulator>.
243 F Coppola, ‘South Africa Has Bailed out a Predatory Lender’, Forbes, 12 August 2014,
4 <http://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/2014/08/12/south-africa-has-bailed-out-apre datory-lender/>.
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institutions have operated virtually unfettered; where consumer debt,
especially among the most vulnerable is growing steeply, the NCR has,
traditionally, been overcautious.
There is no evidence of government bodies specifically regulating microcredit
institutions so as to restrict their lending activities to appropriate levels. The growing
crisis of unsecured credit non-repayment is reflected in worsening ratings for the
most risky of local financial institutions. Consumer debt is reaching record levels,
encouraged until recently as a short-term economic stimulant.244

One of the most serious obstacles for the protection of consumers in South
Africa, and one of the most serious practical failings of the National Credit
Act,245 has been the use of garnishee orders — sometimes multiple garnishee
orders — against the poorest and most vulnerable, and while this issue is
beyond the purview of this article, this aspect deserves concerted and urgent
further attention.246 If the allegations about widespread corruption of, and
collusion with, court officials in the creation of such orders is founded,247 then
one potential solution may be the creation of statutory provisions for both
disgorgement and punitive damages.

VI Conclusion
Reckless lending is antithetical to the concept of consumer protection, and in
a worst case scenario can contribute to, or even precipitate financial contagion
and crisis.248 Predatory lending is unconscionable and has no place in a
modern economy. In South Africa there is a credible argument to be made that
unrestricted predatory lending precipitated a massacre of citizens by armed
agents of the State.249
What this article has been concerned with, however, is not solely the
implementation of the National Credit Act, but rather also its legislative
mechanics, combined with an analysis of its philosophical underpinnings, its
objects and its purport. To that end the South African legislation provides a
244 Bateman, ‘Microcredit and Marikana’, above n 15, 3.
245 National Credit Act.
246 See further: Haupt et al, above n 188; Arde, above n 188; Alec Hogg, ‘Former ABIL CFO
on Why We Should Worry About Unsecured Lending’, BizNews, 22 May 2014
<http://www.biznews.com/interviews/2014/05/22/former-abil-cfo-on-why-we-should-worry
-about-unsecured-lending/>; Melanie Roestoff and Stefan Renke, ‘A Fresh Start for
Individual Debtors: The Role of South African Insolvency and Consumer Protection
Legislation’ (2005) 14 International Insolvency Review 93; Department of Trade and
Industry, Republic of South Africa, above n 9.
247 Theobald, above n 136.
248 For more on the role played by the National Credit Act in insulating South Africa from the
Global Financial Crisis, see: Woker, ‘Why the Need for Consumer Protection Legislation’,
above n 13, 217–18, 231 n 6. See also: Wilson, above n 32, 79.
249 See: Bateman, ‘Microcredit and Marikana’, above n 15; Milford Bateman, ‘Microcredit has
been a Disaster for the Poorest in South Africa’, The Guardian, 19 November 2013
<http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionalsnetwork/2013/nov/19/microcredit-south-africa-loans-disaster>; Saliem Fakir, ‘South Africa:
The Fall of African Bank: How Unsecured Loans Create a Hollow Economy’ (2014) South
African Civil Society Information Service 1 <http://sacsis.org.za/site/article/2108>; Saliem
Fakir, ‘From Marikana to the Fall of African Bank: How Unsecured Loans and Low Wages
Create a Hollow Economy’ (2014) South African Civil Society Information Service 1
<http://sacsis.org.za/site/article/2108>.
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robust legislative framework250 which, if emulated and adequately enforced
would, in this writer’s view, provide for both consumer protection and the
prevention of practices which are ethically indefensible and economically
unsustainable.
If the National Credit Act were emulated elsewhere, the devil would surely
reside in the details, and specifically the successful protection of consumers
would depend upon the details of implementation and enforcement. Put
differently, this car is well-made and thoughtfully designed. From here,
passenger safety and comfort will depend upon the skill and prudence of the
driver.

250 For an empirical analysis of the effects of the National Credit Act on credit extension in
South Africa, see: Chimwemwe Chipeta and Douglas Mbululu, ‘The Effects of the National
Credit Act and the Global Financial Crisis on Domestic Credit Extension: Empirical
Evidence from South Africa’ (2012) 5 Journal of Economic and Financial Sciences 215.

